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Briefly Noted

1. On March 7 the UNGA will reconvene to take up many items left over from the 1960 Agenda plus a bewildering confusion of affairs in the crises areas of the world. Despite the fact that Gromyko, rather than Khrushchev, will head the USSR delegation at the opening, we can expect and should be prepared for fireworks on all the familiar subjects.

2. The trial of Adolf Eichmann is now scheduled to begin in the next few weeks. While we should, of course, in no way condone the Nazi era in Germany we must keep in mind the inevitable use which the Soviets will attempt to make of the occasion to smear the present West German government and its officials, particularly Chancellor Adenauer.

3. A recent (23 February) characteristic speech by Premier Khrushchev contained two claims which deserve further comment:

a. Khrushchev said that when the U.S. made the first atom bomb, "The United States Imperialists began to carry out an atomic policy of intimidating the Socialist countries and primarily the Soviet Union. It was a difficult time for us." Soviet nervousness from 1945 to 1949 (first Soviet A-bomb explosion) is perhaps understandable, considering their paranoid belief that the rest of the world was encircling them. But we would be interested to hear of any concrete cases during that time when the U.S. followed a policy of trying to intimidate the USSR with atomic weapons. Our recollection is that it was during that period that the U.S. offered, in the Morgenthau Plan, to hand over all its atomic materials to an international authority, provided that the authority should have an effective inspection and control system.

b. Khrushchev said that when the U.S. "Imperialists" began to talk of producing a hydrogen bomb, Soviet scientists "as the saying goes, put that in their pie, wound it around their whiskers, worked a bit, and created the hydrogen bomb before it was invented in the United States." It is true that there was some delay in going ahead on an American hydrogen bomb; President Truman did not authorize going ahead until 31 January 1950, four months after the explosion of the first Soviet A-bomb ended hopes of avoiding an atomic arms race. But the first thermonuclear (hydrogen) explosion by the U.S. took place on 16 November 1952, and Malenkov first claimed that the Soviet Union possessed a thermonuclear capability on 9 August 1953. Perhaps Khrushchev will say that his old rival was hiding the Soviet light under a bushel, and that there were actually Soviet thermonuclear explosions at an earlier date. But this raises an interesting point: Malenkov's announcement followed the signature of the armistice in Korea by 13 days; had the Soviets possessed a thermonuclear capability during the Korean negotiations, and particularly had they had it before the U.S. explosion in November

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1952, they probably would have used it as a threat in support of the Communist negotiators at Pannunjom. Can it be that the USSR deliberately concealed its power to avoid having the Chinese call for using it as a bargaining weapon????

354. The USSR Against the UN

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Background: While its recent action has been only an intensification of its efforts to neutralize the UN, the USSR has, from the opening day of the 15th General Assembly in September until the death of Lumumba, followed a calculated plan of action, denouncing and denigrating the efforts of the UN, with particular reference to the Congo, and vilifying its Secretary General, Dag Hammerskjold. It has used its veto to render UN action ineffective. It has encouraged Afro-Asian countries to vote against resolute UN action. It has even taken the unprecedented step of declaring the Secretary General persona non grata and refused to deal with him. It has refused to pay its fair share of UN expenses. At the same time, it has demanded a vast increase in Soviet nationals to be employed in the UN Staff. It has, in short, attempted in every possible way to render the UN ineffective, to emasculate the Secretariat, and to hold the UN and its supporters up to ridicule and contempt.

25X1C10b

In the light of this pattern of action and intention, it is most significant that the Security Council, in the early hours of 21 February, rejected by a vote of 8 to 1 a Soviet resolution calling for Hammerskjold's ouster and demanding UN withdrawal from the Congo, and immediately thereafter adopted by a vote of 9 to 0, with two abstentions (USSR and France), a resolution sponsored by Ceylon, Liberia and the UAR, calling for: (1) strong condemnation of unlawful arrests, deportations and assassination of political leaders in the Congo; (2) demanding immediate cessation of such practices; (3) directing the UN to take all possible steps, including the use of force as a last resort to prevent further occurrence of such practices; and (4) authorizing an investigation to determine responsibility and punishment for the perpetrators.

Although the latter resolution did not specifically refer to the Secretary General, Ambassador Stevenson pointed out that its clear implication supported Hammerskjold by placing responsibility for implementation in his hands and by reaffirming the previous Security Council and General Assembly resolutions which rest responsibility with the Secretary General. It is significant to note that, despite its long and vicious campaign against further UN action in the Congo, the USSR did not dare risk a veto and merely abstained.

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355. Baghdad Press Condemns Radio Moscow

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Background: After Radio Moscow had broadcast criticism of the death sentences imposed upon Communists who had been sentenced for their participation in the Mosul uprising last year, a section of the Baghdad Press countered by attacking Radio Moscow in turn for interfering in internal Iraqi affairs. Al Ahd Jadid and Al Mustaqbal criticized the Swedish Communist Party for sending a cablegram to Qasim for defending the "anarchists," extolling the crime and trampling law under foot. The pro-Qasim newspapers said, of Radio Moscow: "Let the Soviet Radio know that we are free in combating anarchy and anarchism without mercy in the internal field. Every one of us is free to conduct his own affairs in accordance with his particular social system. We ask the friendly Soviet Radio: did its commentators listen to Baghdad Radio? did (it) hear any attacks against (the) internal situation in Moscow? we still do not believe that Moscow Radio does not understand general conditions in our country, the dastardly crimes committed by anarchists and terrible bloody plans prepared by 'comrades' in dark cells. We believe that Radio Moscow understands this as well as the just sentences passed by court martial on the bloody butchers. For this reason we reprove it for its recent provocative comments which harm friendly relations and mutual interests of the two nations." If not actually cleared with Premier Qasim beforehand, it is virtually certain that the Baghdad Press attack was acceptable to Qasim - or it would not have appeared, with the publishers being allowed, as they are to continue to function. The attack, which began on February 10, has continued and on 14 February these papers were joined in the hue and cry by Al Sharq. In an editorial in Al Mustaqbal appearing on the latter date, it was stated: "When Communist gangs failed to induce people to take a long jump with them, they went berserk and started to kill people indiscriminately." On the same day Al Sharq said that it was regrettable that an official radio of a friendly nation should stick its nose in the internal affairs of Iraq. It added that those who were sincere would not lend an ear to such cheap intrigues. Still later (17 February), Al Ahd Jadid added: "All this shows that the Communist movement in Iraq is part and parcel of the international Comintern which is supposed to be abolished but is still in existence."

25X1C10b

Background. T. D. Lysenko, a man of limited scientific ability, is a disciple of Ivan Michurin, a successful fruit breeder with a complete lack of scientific training. Michurinistic biology, as interpreted by Lysenko, conformed more closely to dialectic materialism than did the classical theories of Mendel and in 1948 it was officially recognized by the CPSU. This theory stressed the effect of environment and claimed it saw the possibility of inheriting environmentally produced effects. Lysenkoism, as it came to be called, was not only more in accord with Marxist-Leninist theories but also conformed closely to the theories of Pavlov because it emphasized the possibility of transforming plants and animals through environment, thus providing a "scientific" basis for the Stalinist hope for the creation of a new Soviet man.

In the last fifteen years of Stalin's life, Lysenko flourished (despite the opposition of even some Soviet scientists) as the tsar of Soviet genetics, biology, agronomy, and botany. From 1953 - 1957 (after Stalin's death), however, his influence began to wane. In 1956 he resigned as head of the All-Union Agricultural Academy. But he has for the past few years been staging a comeback. The extent of Lysenko's renaissance (perhaps only as a scarecrow) was not known until recently when Professor Olshansky, deputy chairman of the All-Union Institute and a long-time disciple of Lysenko's, was named Minister of Agriculture to replace Vladimir V. Matskevich, a farm specialist from the Ukraine who had long been associated with Nikita Khrushchev. The key factor in the situation, apparently, is Khrushchev's insistence upon radically high increases in Soviet farm production which, though not as deficient as in Communist China, have fallen far short of the optimistic goals that Khrushchev and his colleagues have set. Soviet scientists have, no doubt, been given an opportunity to view Lysenko as an example of the fate (like Lysenko's) which awaits them if they do not toe the Party line.

Guidance. We wish to show particularly to audiences in underdeveloped

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25X1C10b

Background: Following the invasion of Tibet by the Communist Chinese armies in October 1950, and after resisting unsuccessfully for six months, the Tibetan Government was forced to sign a 17-point Agreement with Communist China on 23 May 1951. This agreement provided that the existing political system in Tibet would not be altered, that the Tibetan people had the right of exercising regional autonomy, that in matters pertaining to various reforms in Tibet, there would be no compulsion of the part of the Chinese Government and that the local government of Tibet should carry out reforms of its own accord.

Violations of the Sino-Tibetan Agreement started almost immediately and continued for eight years, culminating in the action dissolving the local government of Tibet. The struggle against engulfment by the Chinese began in 1952 and culminated in the flight of the Dalai Lama in March 1959. Since the occupation of 1950, most of the measures taken to place Tibet directly under Peking's control and to make Tibetans embrace communism clearly violated the 1951 Agreement. Tibetan resistance to Communist China was sparked by the Communists' coordinated political and military policy aimed at the communization of Tibet.

While the immediate purpose of the political changes which were forcibly imposed by the Chinese was to assure Peking's absolute control over the regional administration, they also had the further objective of setting the stage for a comprehensive program of "social" reform which would transform Tibet into an integrated, indistinguishable part of the socialized Chinese state. This is understandable when one remembers that, in 1939, Mao Tse-tung laid down the claim that scores of national minorities, including the Mongols, the Tibetans, the Uighurs, the Koreans and many others, are fundamentally Chinese and belong rightfully to China.

Communist China did not wait long to reveal that the real purpose behind the invasion and direct control of Tibet was to use the latter as a weapon to carry out her plans for political and territorial expansion. Agents of the Chicoms posing as Tibetan refugees, setting out from Tibet, started to infiltrate into Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim as a prelude to the eventual penetration of the border lands of India itself. Maps published by the Chinese Communist Government represent considerable parts of Burma, Bhutan, Nepal and India, including portions of Kashmir, as Chinese territory. By the summer of 1959, the Chinese Communists had increased the size of their troop concentrations along the Indian-Tibetan frontier and there were continuing reports of Chinese Communist penetrations of Bhutan, Sikkim, Uttar Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir and along the border of Assam in the north east of India. Finally, the Chinese People's Republic officially claimed nearly 40,000 square miles of Indian territory.

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Background: Karl Marx was a Western European thinker, economist and revolutionary, whose ideas were strictly a product of Nineteenth Century European industrial and political-ideological developments. Lenin and his Russian disciples were broadly products of the same intellectual, social, and political background. Nevertheless, the Communists, in extending and promoting their influence in Africa, Asia and Latin America, have managed to obscure the strictly European origins of their thinking (as well as their material support) and identify themselves as purveyors of "native-born", nationalist-sounding solutions to the problems of the developing areas. The Chinese Communists are aware of the difficulties in promoting a foreign ideology in these regions. In their efforts to woo Africans, from the Bandung Conference to their current programs, they have stressed that the Chinese are to be counted among the "colored" peoples who comprise the vast majority of the world's population.

A major reason for the success of the Communists is that most of the intellectual and political leaders of the developing countries are preoccupied with the search for fast working panaceas and, at the same time, predisposed to reject suggestions they think they can identify with the European colonial past. For this reason, these leaders also tend to reject attempts to describe communism as a new colonialism or a new imperialism. For them the terms colonialism and imperialism have very specific referents, bringing to their minds arrogant overlords of plantations or officious functionaries of some European regime. The Communists apparently need only to stress the newness and difference of their programs and to label those who call attention to communism's true aims and background apologists for the past colonial rulers, to becloud the fact that communism is equally foreign and European. Because the former colonial rulers were usually anti-Communist, in addition to their other characteristics, the Communists' tasks of identifying anti-communism with locally unpopular issues is made easier.

Nevertheless, communism is a foreign, a European ("white") ideology, and both Marx and Lenin denigrated the peasant, the mainstay of the societies of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Although the Chinese Communists claim to have corrected this error and appeal to the developing areas on the basis of their having given the peasants a major role in their revolution, well-publicized facts belie their claims (See Guidance #345). The Communist failure in the agricultural sector in both Russia and China is conspicuous (See Guidance #347). Serious planning and action programs in developing countries should be based not on the adaption of Communist blueprints, but upon the situations that actually obtain there. India's economic program combines, for example, a measure of centralized planning and, at the same time, the encouragement of capital formation and investment by the private sector.

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